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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code is found in chapters
670-680 of the FloridaStatutes. This survey covers the substantive changes
in Florida's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code") and the cases
interpreting the Code during the period of July 1, 1993 to July 15, 1994.
During the past year, there were only a few cases with written opinions that
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1968. He received a Juris Doctor degree with honors from the University of Florida in 1973.
Mr. Young has been with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith &Cutler, P.A. since
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insolvent financial institutions. Mr. Young frequently lectures on the above mentioned topics
and is the author of "Creation of Security Interests," a chapter in Secured Transactionsin
Florida, a Florida Bar publication.
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dealt with substantive Code issues. This survey presents the few cases that
warrant discussion.
II. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The only substantive change to the UCC during the survey period was
the repeal of chapter 676 of the FloridaStatutes, relating to bulk transfers.'
At least two events prompted the formation of a subcommittee to review the
status of chapter 676. First, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute had recommended
repeal, or at least significant revision, of the UCC article on bulk transfers.2
Second, many members of the Florida Bar had expressed concern that
chapter 676 was serving no useful purpose in its present form.'
The subcommittee, formed by both the Financial Institutions and the
Bankruptcy/UCC Committees to study and report on the status of chapter
676, recommended the chapter's repeal and advised against any further bulk
sales legislation.' The subcommittee found that compliance with chapter
676 substantially decreased due to the cost and delay involved when the
provision was followed.5 The subcommittee also reported that chapter 676
often gave little relief to aggrieved creditors and that the chapter's remedy,
nullifying the transfer, was not practical in today's transactions.' The
Florida Legislature followed the subcommitee's recommendation and the
repeal of chapter 676 of the Florida Statutes became effective on July 1,
1993. 7
III. CASES INTERPRETING FLORIDA'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE

A. Lease as a Security Interest
In In re Howell,8 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Florida determined to what extent a particular lease constituted a financing

1. Act of Apr. 23, 1993, ch. 93-77, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws 436, 436.
2. STAFF OF FLA. SENATE COMM. ON UCC, SB 710 (1993) STAFF ANALYSIS 2 (Feb.
22, 1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ch. 93-77, §§ 3-4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 436.
8. 161 B.R. 285 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993).
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arrangement making any security interest created by the lease avoidable by
the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544.9 In Howell, the
debtor entered into an agreement with the defendant to purchase the good
will and parts inventory of the defendant's auto repair business.' In a
separate agreement, the debtor agreed to lease from the defendant all the
furniture, equipment, and tools for use in the business." The debtor
operated the auto repair business until he filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition."
The plaintiff, who was the bankruptcy trustee, sought a
declaratory judgment that the lease was really a financing arrangement rather
than a true lease, making any interest avoidable by the trustee due to the
3
defendant's failure to file a UCC-1 financing statement.'
To determine the character of the agreement, the court looked to
section 671.201(37) of the FloridaStatutes for the definition of "security
interest," and noted that subsection (a) of the statute would require a finding
that there was a security interest if the lease contained a nontermination
clause along with one of the other enumerated items. 4 Because the lease
in question did not have a nontermination clause, the court then looked to
subsection (b) of the statute, which states that a transaction does not create
a security interest merely because one of the listed items is present. 5
The court held that any relevant factor or circumstance may be
considered when determining whether the transaction created a security
interest or a true lease. 6 The court explained that the statute merely
precluded the finding of a security interest based on any single factor listed
in subsection (b). 7 After reviewing the circumstances surrounding the
lease, the court listed nine factors that indicated that the lease created a
security interest.' The court concluded that it was left with "an unmistak-

9. Id. at 287.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Howell, 161 B.R. at 287.

14. Id. at 287-88.
15. Id. at 288.
16. Id. at 289.

17. Id. at 288.
18. Howell, 161 B.R. at 289. The nine factors set out by the court are:
1) Lessee is responsible for insuring the leased property;
2)
Lessee bears the risk of loss or damage to the subject property, and bore

risk of any liability arising from its use;
3) Lessee is responsible for the payment of all taxes associated the [sic]
leased property;
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able impression that the lease was entered to effectuate a security interest in
the leased property."' 9
B. Florida'sBlood Shield Statute
In Walls v. Armour PharmaceuticalCo.,20 a personal representative
of the estate of a hemophiliac brought a products liability wrongful death
action against the manufacturer of plasma products which allegedly led to
the hemophiliac's death from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS"). 2' One of the issues decided in Walls by the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida was whether Florida's
"blood-shield" statute 22 precluded failure-to-warn products liability claims
against a seller of blood or blood products.23 This issue was raised when
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs claim was time-barred because the
applicable statute of limitations was Florida's four year negligence statute
of limitations rather than the limitations on products liability actions.24
The defendant relied on Silva v. Southwest FloridaBlood Bank, Inc.,25
a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, in support of its
argument that Florida's "blood-shield" statute essentially turned the
plaintiffs claim into a pure negligence action.26 The defendant contended

4)
Lessee is responsible for all maintenance and repairs of the leased
property;
5)
Default provisions of the lease are similar to those found in a typical
financing arrangement;
6)
The lease contains a remedy provision which is similar to those found in
financing arrangements;
7)
The lease specifically excluded any warranties;
8)
The term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic
life of the leased property; and
9)
The lessee has the right to purchase the leased property at the end of the
lease term for nominal additional consideration.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 290.
20. 832 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
21. Id. at 1469.
22. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1993).
23. Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1472-74.
24. Id. at 1471.
25. 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992).
26. Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1472.
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that the statute precluded a products liability claim against it." Upon
careful review of Silva, the Walls court held that Silva did not support the
defendant's position.28 The court noted that the Silva court stated that
Florida's "blood-shield" statute "was enacted to eliminate actions for strict
liability against blood banks and to limit U.C.C. warranties in the context
'
The Walls court pointed out that
of the sale of blood by blood banks."29
section 672.316(5),30 by its own terms, only applies to allegations of
breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose.'
The court stated that the plaintiff's claim was "not a claim for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness or merchantability" and refused to extend
the statute's reach to failure-to-warn actions. 32 The court concluded that
the statute did not limit the plaintiff's ability to bring a failure-to-warn
action against a manufacturer of blood products or convert the claim into a
pure negligence action.33 Consequently, the court held that the products
liability statute of limitation applied to the instant case.
C. Negotiable Instruments
The only decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida relating
to the UCC during the last year is State v. Family Bank of Hallandale.5
The issue before the court was whether state warrants were negotiable
instruments under the UCC. 36 The comptroller had placed a stop payment
order on a warrant when it was discovered that the original warrant had
been mailed to the wrong company." Several months after the Federal
Reserve Bank of Miami returned the original warrant to the respondent due
to the stop payment order, the respondent filed suit against the State of
Florida.3" The respondent argued that it was a "holder in due course"

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 1472-73.
Id. at 1473.
FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1993).
Walls, 832 F. Supp. at 1473.
Id. at 1474.
Id.
Id.
623 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
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under the theory that state warrants were negotiable instruments, and thus
it was entitled to reimbursement by the State.39
In a unanimous decision, overruling the First District Court of Appeal,
the court held that state warrants were not negotiable instruments.4" In
support of its conclusion, the court noted that the Florida Legislature
amended section 673.1041 of the FloridaStatutes as a direct response to the
trial court's decision in the case. 4' The substance of this amendment is
now found at section 673.1041(11) of the FloridaStatutes and provides that
"[a] warrant of this state is not a negotiable instrument governed by this
chapter."42 Consequently, the court held that the respondent was not a
holder in due course and that it took the warrant subject to the State's
43
defense that it had issued a valid stop payment order.
D. Bank Deposits and Collections
The Fifth District Court of Appeal determined in Sun Bank N.A. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.41 whether a bank may charge
back a customer's account for a check with a forged or unauthorized
signature once the account had received final settlement and payment.45
In Sun Bank, a check drawn on an account at Citizens and Southern
National Bank ("C & S Bank") payable to Physician's Computer Systems
("PCS") was endorsed by a PCS employee as PCS's chief operating
officer. 46 The check was then delivered to Cosmopolitan Lady Spa,
Inc./Cosmopolitan Fitness Corporation ("Cosmopolitan") where it was
endorsed and deposited into its account at Merrill Lynch.47 Merrill Lynch
in turn deposited the check into its account with Sun Bank and later
received final settlement and payment.48

39. Id. at 475-76.
40. Family Bank, 623 So. 2d at 477-78.
41. Id. at 478-79. The court referred to chapter 91-216, section 1, 1991 Florida Laws
2065, which added subsection (4) to section 673.1041 of the FloridaStatutes.
42. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(11) (1993).
43. Family Bank, 623 So. 2d at 479.
44. 637 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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More than one year later, C & S Bank notified Sun Bank that the
endorsement by the PCS employee was unauthorized.4 9 An affidavit from
PCS's president stated that the person who endorsed the check was no
longer employed by PCS at the time the check was signed. 0 Even though
Merrill Lynch denied liability, Sun Bank debited the amount of the check
from Merrill Lynch's account without notifying it.5 Consequently, Merrill
52
Lynch filed suit against Sun Bank for wrongfully debiting its account.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant Merrill
Lynch's motion for summary judgment and held that "Sun Bank's right to
charge back Merrill Lynch's account was limited to the midnight deadline
or within a longer reasonable time priorto final settlement" as specified by
section 674.212 of the FloridaStatutes. 3 The court refused to recognize
an exception to the final settlement deadline just because an unauthorized
endorsement was involved. 4 The court also rejected the argument that
section 674.406 of the FloridaStatutes, relating to the customer's duty to
discover and report an unauthorized signature or alteration, authorized Sun
Bank's actions.55 The court reasoned that section 674.406 allows a claim
to be made upon a drawee bank, but it does not authorize the collecting
bank to remove funds unilaterally from a customer's account. 6
The court pointed out that even though Sun Bank was precluded from
charging back, it could still assert a breach of transfer warranty claim under
section 674.207 of the Florida Statutes.57 Concluding that summary
judgment was properly granted, the court stated that "while questions
regarding the unauthorized endorsement may be material to a suit on a
warranty claim, they are not material to the issue of whether Sun Bank
could, unilaterally and without notice, charge back Merrill Lynch's
account."5"

49.
50.
51.
52.

Sun Bank, 637 So. 2d at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id.

53. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Sun Bank, 637 So. 2d at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283.
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E. Letters of Credit
The First District Court of Appeal held that although a creditor can
perfect a security interest in a letter of credit by possession, the creditor may
not have a right to draw directly against proceeds from the letter of
credit.59 Furthermore, the creditor's security interest may be diminished
by set-offs against the letter of credit beneficiary by the person for whom
the letter of credit was issued.6" In Futch, a bank loaned a borrower
monies secured by the proceeds of a $110,000 letter of credit which was
issued to secure a judgment in favor of the borrower.6 ' Subsequent to the
bank's accepting assignments of the expected letter of credit proceeds as
collateral for the loans, the borrower and the judgment debtor agreed that
the judgment debtor would offset approximately $68,000 against the
judgment amount as settlement for another lawsuit.62 When the borrower
filed a petition in bankruptcy, the creditor sought an adjudication as to its
priority to proceeds from the letter of credit.
The Futch court held that the creditor had properly perfected its interest
in the letter of credit by taking possession as required by section 679.305 of
the FloridaStatutes.63 However, since the letter of credit was not expressly assignable, the creditor did not have a right to draw directly against the
proceeds of the letter of credit because only the borrower or the trustee in
bankruptcy maintained the right to execute a draw.'
Moreover, the
judgment debtor's set-off was held permissible and the amount of proceeds
available to the creditor under the letter of credit was effectively reduced.65
Thus, creditors should be careful when lending monies secured by proceeds
in letters of credit that are not expressly assignable since they will not have
the right to make direct draws on such letters of credit. Additionally, such
creditors should be aware that the value of their security interest may be
reduced by subsequent agreement between the borrower and the person for
whom the letter of credit was issued.

59. Citizens & Peoples Nat'l Bank of Pensacola v. Futch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D693,
D696 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at D693.
62. Id.
63. Id. at D696.
64. Futch, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at D696.
65. Id. at D695.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/10

8

Young: UCC Article 9

1994]

Young

F. Investment Securities
In First Bank of Immokalee v. Rogers NK Seed Co.,66 the Second
District Court of Appeal addressed whether the appellant's security interest
in stock owned by Precision Agricultural Products, Inc. ("Precision") was
superior to appellee's judgment lien. 7 Precision had signed a security
agreement listing several shares of stock as collateral for a loan from the
appellant."8 "Because the stock was in the possession of Precision's
broker," the appellant notified the broker by mail that Precision had assigned
the stock as collateral for a loan.69 The broker responded by refusing to
"'hold the securities in trust for anyone other than our client,' but offering
to assist in a physical transfer of stock certification if that was the desire of
Precision."7 However, the appellant took no further action at that time.7'
About a year and a half later, the appellee obtained ajudgment against
Precision.72 Subsequently, the appellee discovered the existence of the
stocks and attempted to sell them to satisfy the judgment."3 This action
prompted the appellant to intervene "to establish the priority of its security
interest."74 In reversing the trial court's decision, the court held that the
appellant's security interest had priority over the appellee's judgment
lien.75 First, the Immokalee court pointed out that according to section
678.321(1) of the FloridaStatutes, a security interest in stock is perfected
when it "is 'transferred' to the secured party or its designee pursuant to a
provision of section 678.313(1).,,76 Next, the court stated that Precision's
broker was a "financial intermediary" as defined in section 678.313(4) and
that according to section 678.313(1)(h), a transfer occurred when written
notification was received by the "financial intermediary on whose books the
Finally, the court
interest of the transferor in the security appears ...
concluded that the letter received by Precision's broker, notifying it that
Precision had assigned the stock to appellant, constituted a "transfer" of the

66. 637 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Immokalee, 637 So. 2d at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75. Id. at 13.
76. Immokalee, 637 So. 2d at 12.
77. Id.
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stock pursuant to these provisions.7" The court noted that Precision's
broker "had no ability to decline or prevent the transfer that resulted from
'
its receipt of the notification."79
G. Secured Transactions
1. Chattel Paper
In Blazer FinancialServices, Inc. v. HarborFederal Savings & Loan
Ass 'n,8" the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether
a purchaser of chattel paper was entitled to take the paper free and clear of
a prior security interest to the full extent of the paper's face value."' In
Blazer, the appellee held a perfected security interest in ajewelry company's
"existing or acquired collateral, including its accounts and chattel paper, at
three of its retail locations."82 Later, the appellant agreed to purchase from
the retail jewelry company 1100 sales contracts which consisted of retail
installment sales contracts, security agreements, and accounts receivable.83
Over half of these contracts were subject to the security interest held by the
appellee and were purchased by the appellant at a discounted price. 4 Later
the same year, the jewelry company filed for bankruptcy.85 Subsequently,
the appellee filed suit alleging that the appellant converted its collateral.
The appellant claimed that it had priority over the appellee's security interest
under section 679.308 of the FloridaStatutes.86

78. Id.
79. Id.

80. 623 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 582.

82. Id. at 581.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Blazer, 623 So. 2d at 581.
86. Id. Section 679.308 of the FloridaStatutes provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security
interest in the chattel paper or instrument:
(1) Which is perfected under s. 679.304... or under 679.306 ... if he
acts without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is subject to
a security interest; or
(2) Which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a
security interest (s. 679.306) even though he knows that the specific paper
or instrument is subject to the security interest.
FLA. STAT. § 679.308 (1993).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's
finding that the appellant had purchased the chattel paper in its ordinary
course of business and without knowledge of the prior security interest
according to section 679.308.
However, reversing the decision of the
trial court, the appellate court held that the protection provided by section
679.308 extended to the full face value of the paper, irrespective of the
amount paid by the purchaser of the paper.8 8 The court reasoned that
"[m]odem commercial practices make it impracticable for a retail lender
purchasing chattel paper in the ordinary course of its business to inquire into
the factual circumstances surrounding the transactions on which the paper
is based[,]" while a money lender is in a better position to protect itself
against the borrower's actions.8 9 The court also pointed out that its
holding was consistent with the UCC's official comment to section 679.308
of the FloridaStatutes."
2. Security Agreements
Reversing the trial court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held in
Cook v. Theme Park Ventures, Inc.,9 that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether certain documents constituted a written security
agreement.92 In Cook, the debtor brought an action for declaratory
judgment against a storage company to enjoin the company from selling a
certain painting stored by the debtor to cover storage fees.93 An assignee
of the creditor intervened, claiming that he had a security interest in the
painting, and because the debtor had defaulted on its loan, the assignee was
entitled to possession of the painting.94 The court stated two or more
documents together may evidence a security agreement." The court noted
that whether a security agreement existed was important due to section
679.203 of the FloridaStatutes which provides: a "security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor and does not attach to the property unless the

87. Blazer, 623 So. 2d at 582.

88. Id. at 583.
89. Id. (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 713 S.W.2d
351 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)).

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

633 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
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collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to an agreement
or the debtor has signed a security agreement .... ""
The court reviewed documents sent from debtor's predecessor in
interest to the creditor regarding the use of the painting as collateral for a
new loan. The documents included a security agreement, a UCC financing
statement, and a letter, signed by debtor's predecessor, specifically
referencing the security agreement covering the painting and the UCC
financing statement.97 The letter stated that "if the documents appear to
be in order, then the funds could be sent by check or wire .. . ."" It was
undisputed that debtor's predecessor wired the funds a few days later.99
The Cook court concluded that the documents, taken together, were
"sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding the existence of a security
agreement covering the painting."'0 0 The court pointed out that the
comment to section 679.203 states that the writing requirement of the
section is in the nature of that required for the statute of frauds.'
Under
this standard, only one of the documents being considered to satisfy the
writing requirement must be signed by the debtor, provided that the signed
writing refers to the other necessary documents. 0 2 Thus, the court
concluded that the letter signed by the debtor's predecessor along with the
create an
security agreement and UCC financing statement were enough0 to
3
issue of fact even though the other documents were unsigned.
3. Certificates of Deposits
In Bank of Winter Park v. Resolution Trust Corp., °4 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal determined the respective rights of two parties who had
competing interests in a certificate of deposit ("CD"). 5 Specifically, the
court addressed the issue of whether a bank was prevented from asserting
its set-off rights against a party who had a perfected security interest under
article 9106 The appellant, Winter Park, had loaned $300,000 to three

96. Cook, 633 So. 2d at 470 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 679.203(1)-.203(1)(a) (1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Cook, 633 So. 2d at 471.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 633 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at 54-55.
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officers of American Pioneer Federal Savings Bank ("American Pioneer").
Although the loan was supposed to be unsecured, the appellant insisted that
one of the officers maintain an account with the appellant bank. 7 As a
result, one of the officers deposited $100,000 in an account and the
appellant issued a CD to him in that amount. The CD contained provisions
prohibiting transfer without the appellant's consent and granting the
appellant certain set-off rights.'0° A short time later, the officer used the
CD as collateral for a loan from American Pioneer without the appellant's
knowledge or consent." 9
About a year later, the appellant notified the officer that he was in
default on the loan." 0 The next day, American Pioneer informed the
appellant that it planned to redeem the CD when the CD matured later the
same month."' Subsequently, the appellant told American Pioneer of its
intention to exercise its contractual right of set-off against the CD proceeds.
The appellee, as receiver for American
Pioneer, sued the appellant to
2
recover the proceeds of the CD."
The court began its discussion by stating that the decision in this case
would be governed by the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens
National Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein."' Under the reasoning of
Bornstein, the nonnegotiable CD at issue in the instant case was an
"instrument" as defined in section 679.105(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes.
Thus the officer's assignment to American Pioneer "was 'a transfer entitled
'' 4 However, the Winter
to secured transaction treatment under article 9."
Park court noted that the Florida Supreme Court, in Bornstein, further
construed section 679.104(9) of the FloridaStatutes to mean that a bank
does not need to comply with the provisions of article 9 in order to preserve
its set-off rights." 5 Thus, the instant court concluded that the appellant
had the right of set-off, as long as its right accrued prior to receiving notice
of the assignment of the CD to American Pioneer."6
Reversing the decision of the trial court, the appellate court held that
the appellant's interest in the CD was superior to the appellee's because the
107. Id. at 54.

108. Id.
109. Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 54.

I10.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Citizens Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein, 374 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1979).
Winter Park,633 So. 2d at 54 (citing Bornstein, 374 So. 2d at 6).

115. Id. at 55.

116. Id.
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appellant had declared the officer in default on the loan before it was
notified of the CD's assignment to American Pioneer." 7 Moreover, the
court gave an alternative ground for reversal. The court stated that the
Bornstein court specifically held that section 679.318(4) of the Florida
Statutes did not invalidate the CD's restrictions on assignment." 8 Therefore, the court concluded that the appellant should have prevailed because
American Pioneer took assignment of the CD subject to its provision
requiring the appellant's prior written consent." 9
The court acknowledged that its interpretation of Bornsteinwas directly
contrary to two federal court decisions. 2 ' Bornstein reached the Supreme
Court of Florida upon certified questions from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 2' However, applying the Florida Supreme
Court's answers to the certified questions in Bornstein, the Winter Park
court awarded the CD proceeds to the secured creditor.'22 Likewise, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted
Bornstein to mean that the priority provisions in article 9 govern even
though the dispute involves a bank with set-off rights.'23
IV. CONCLUSION
The UCC in Florida has not undergone remarkable change in the past
year. During the survey period, there was little revision of the Florida
Statutes which constitute the UCC, other than the repeal of chapter 676,
which deals with bulk transfers. Although recent case law reveals no
particular trend in the courts' interpretation of the UCC in any specific area,
the cases reviewed herein should help further clarify the rights of those
conducting commercial transactions in Florida.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 56.
Id.
Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 56.
See id. at 55.
See Bornstein, 374 So. 2d at 6.
Winter Park, 633 So. 2d at 54.
Id. at 55.
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